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Using China’s A-share listed ﬁrms from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically
tests how media governance aﬀects ﬁrms’ levels of overinvestment and whether
external supervision and informal institutional mechanisms reduce these levels.
We ﬁnd that media governance and overinvestment are signiﬁcantly negatively
related. When ﬁrms are located in a district with a stronger media governance
environment their levels of overinvestment are lower, indicating that media
governance signiﬁcantly restricts overinvestment behavior. When internal
corporate governance eﬃciency is low, the negative relationship between the
media environment and overinvestment behavior is signiﬁcantly enhanced,
indicating that when internal governance or formal systems have reduced
eﬃcacy, an important complementary role is played by external supervision
and the informal institutional environment. After considering endogeneity
and diﬀerent measures of overinvestment and other related variables, the
conclusions remain unchanged.
 2014 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
In the recent years, overinvestment has become an important problem in China’s macro- and micro-
economic development. For example, a report released by Li, China’s chief representative to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), on April 15, 2013 stated that the level of overinvestment in China was 12–20% above
42 H. Zhang, Z. Su / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 41–57the equilibrium level as a share of GDP.1 Academic research shows that serious problems are caused by
ineﬃcient investment by Chinese corporations (Tang et al., 2007) and that overinvestment by listed Chinese
companies is relatively common (e.g., Li and Jiang, 2007; Wei and Liu, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Luo et al.,
2012). Scholars have recently explored methods for managing overinvestment, mostly by focusing on the
level of overinvestment by corporate or direct stakeholders. That is, recent studies on the governance of
overinvestment have mostly been conducted from the internal corporate perspective and less attention has
been paid to the role of informal institutional mechanisms, such as the external environment or external
supervision. In China, a typical emerging market economy in transition, the formalization and implementation
of the legal system is not perfect and certain informal institutions have an important role in managing ﬁrms’
behavior (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2013).
Many recent studies have shown that the eﬀects of media supervision on public opinion may eﬀectively
supplement internal corporate governance. In particular, given the high degree of information asymmetry
in the capital market, the media acts as an information intermediary (Zavyalova et al., 2012). By collecting
and disseminating information, the media develops an eﬀective information environment and helps to reduce
asymmetry between corporations and external investors. As a typical emerging market economy, China
exhibits a wide disparity in the levels of media development in diﬀerent areas (Yu, 2012), providing a useful
setting for examining the supervisory function of the media governance environment on corporate behavior.
Based on China’s A-share listed ﬁrms from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically tests how media governance
aﬀects the level of overinvestment and whether external supervision and informal institutions can reduce
overinvestment. We ﬁnd that media governance and overinvestment are signiﬁcantly negatively related. That
is, if a district has a stronger media governance environment, corporations’ levels of overinvestment are lower,
suggesting that media governance signiﬁcantly restricts overinvestment behavior. In addition, when corporate
governance eﬃciency is low, the negative relationship between the media environment and overinvestment
behavior is signiﬁcantly enhanced, indicating that external supervision and the informal institutional
environment play an important complementary role when internal governance or formal systems have reduced
eﬃcacy. After considering endogeneity and diﬀerent measures of overinvestment and other related variables,
the conclusions remain unchanged.
Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it shows that the media governance
environment can help to eﬃciently reduce the overinvestment levels of corporations, which enriches and
expands the literature on the governance function of media supervision. Second, it explores how overinvest-
ment behavior by corporations may be inhibited. Because previous studies on overinvestment governance
have mostly focused on the design or restriction of overinvestment within corporations or by their direct stake-
holders, little attention has been paid to supervisory roles outside the ﬁrm and to informal institutional mech-
anisms. Therefore, this paper further extends the literature in this ﬁeld. Third, our study shows that when
internal corporate governance fails, restrictions on overinvestment that are based on external supervision
are signiﬁcantly enhanced. In other words, when a formal system of internal governance fails, external
oversight or informal institutional arrangements can have a signiﬁcant supplementary role. This paper thus
complements the literature that explores the corporate governance eﬀects of informal institutions.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and introduces
the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and our research design. Section 4 presents and
analyzes the empirical results. Section 5 provides some conclusions.2. Literature review and research hypotheses
2.1. Literature review
2.1.1. Corporate overinvestment behavior
The previous academic literature mainly discusses the reasons for overinvestment from the principal-agent
and asymmetric information perspectives. In terms of the principal-agent view, Jensen (1986) argues that the1 Source: http://ﬁnance.ifeng.com/news/macro/20130416/7909163.shtml.
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try to make investments using a ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow and may even invest in projects with a negative NPV to
pursue the beneﬁts of corporate expansion and construct a “corporate empire.” From the asymmetric
information perspective, information asymmetry between outside investors and internal corporate managers
regarding ﬁrms’ asset values and investment project earnings is widespread in China (Zhang and Lu, 2009).
Insiders possess more information about the value of a company and are more likely to seize an
opportunity to sell over-priced assets in the market. If the market fails to detect such overvaluations, then
overinvestment occurs (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Heinkel and Zechner, 1990; Baker et al., 2003;
Pan and Jin, 2003).
There has been much discussion about methods for regulating overinvestment. Most of the literature
contemplates restricting overinvestment by strengthening supervision or constraining corporations’ ﬁnancial
policies. For example, some studies suggest that the board of directors (e.g., Chung et al., 2003; Chen and
Xie, 2011), institutional investors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ye et al., 2012), the controlling shareholder
(Tang et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2010) or other supervisory parties can signiﬁcantly reduce overinvestment by
corporations. Other studies show that strengthening internal controls (Cheng et al., 2013), raising levels of
debt (e.g., Huang and Shen, 2009), distributing cash dividends (e.g., Tang, 2007; Wei and Liu, 2007) or other
internal ﬁnancial policy constraints can help to improve the eﬃciency of corporate investments.
2.1.2. Governance eﬃciency of media supervision
The media can play an important role in encouraging public participation in corporate supervision. Media
supervision can eﬀectively supplement traditional methods of governance by greatly reducing the costs
incurred by stakeholders in searching for information, and may thereby indirectly provide eﬀective supervision
(Zhang, 2009). Public review via media communications can be an important mechanism for the social super-
vision of corporate governance (Craven and Marston, 1997; Li and Shen, 2010). In general, the media does not
own stakes in listed companies or exercise direct control over them, but it can inﬂuence some users of the
information it provides to play a role in corporate governance (Yang and Zhao, 2012). The media’s role in
corporate governance has been veriﬁed in many studies (Besley and Prat, 2002; Miller, 2006; Dyck et al.,
2008; Joe et al., 2009; Xu and Xin, 2011; Yang and Zhao, 2012). For example, Gillan (2006) notes in a liter-
ature review related to corporate governance that the media is equal to the law in its importance as an external
governance mechanism. Joe et al. (2009) examine the worst boards of directors in the United States as pub-
lished by Business Weekly in 1996, 1997 and 2000 and ﬁnd that media reports that are critical of such boards
lead them to attempt to improve their eﬃciency, exemplifying the media’s role in governance. Xu and Xin
(2011) argue that the media played an important role in governance during the Split Share Structure Reform,
while Yang and Zhao (2012) ﬁnd that the media has a supervisory function in setting executive pay rates in
listed companies.
There are also attempts in the literature to explain how the media plays a supervisory role in corporate
governance. Zhang (2009) argues that it is diﬃcult to obtain all of the necessary information and knowledge
about companies because of the high costs of information searching. Instead, investors are only able to
obtain certain information and remain ignorant about other aspects. Media reports can greatly reduce the
cost of investors’ access to information and make the information they receive more complete, which helps
stakeholders to eﬀectively supervise a corporation and make rational investment decisions. Yan (2008)
argues that the media supervision of ﬁrms aﬀects three aspects of corporate governance: companies’ internal
governance structures, the internal and external governance mechanisms of various stakeholders, and
external supervision. Li and Xiong (2012) note that the media mainly provides supervision through the
dissemination of information. Through information intermediaries, the media can achieve the desired eﬀect
of expanding the amount of information available and can then aﬀect the audience’s understanding of that
information, or it can change the conditions for the distribution of information. Thus, the media can
eﬀectively reduce the information asymmetry problem whenever a contract is signed and implemented.
Compared with legal and regulatory supervision, which have shortcomings such as high costs, a heavy
burden of proof and delayed implementation, the media has the advantage of early intervention and low
costs relating to corporate supervision.
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To a certain extent, media supervision can solve both the “principal-agent” and “information asymmetry”
problems.
In terms of the “principal-agent” problem, the media can help to expose listed ﬁrms supervised by
related parties via the dissemination of information, information manufacturing and other functions. It
can eﬀectively restrain managers’ opportunistic behavior and reduce the incidence of agency problems
(Yu et al., 2011). Scholars outside China have conﬁrmed that the reputation mechanism can signiﬁcantly
restrict manager behavior (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dyck et al., 2008). Although many Chinese
scholars do not consider a manager reputation mechanism to be active in China, Zheng et al. (2011)
use IPO data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets to show that negative media reports cause
ordinary people to pay attention to companies, which constitutes an external constraint on the behavior of
managers who care about their ﬁrms’ reputation. Liang et al. (2012) note that media supervision reduces
corporate agency costs by activating internal corporate governance mechanisms. After negative reports in
the media, a ﬁrm’s stakeholders tend to believe that the ﬁrm’s problems may be even more serious than
portrayed and will therefore take active measures to safeguard their own interests and improve eﬃciency
(Yao et al., 2011).
In terms of “information asymmetry,” Owen (2002) argues that the media is a very important information
intermediary institution in modern economic life and a potential channel for reducing information asymmetry.
The media can increase market eﬃciency by reducing the degree of information asymmetry among investors
so that information can aﬀect stock prices more quickly (Li and Xiong, 2012). The media can be seen as an
alternative mechanism for disclosure of information relating to listed companies and media coverage can
reduce the degree of information asymmetry in capital markets (Zhang and Liu, 2011). Yan (2008) demon-
strates that the media plays an important role in reducing information asymmetry from the four perspectives
of manufacturing information, the auxiliary processing of information disclosure and re-disclosure, dissemi-
nating information, and guiding public opinion.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the important role played by media governance in reducing information
asymmetry and solving the principal–agent problem, improvements to the media supervision environment
should eﬀectively decrease corporations’ overinvestment levels. The media can supervise and govern corporate
behavior through the reputation mechanism or by encouraging the involvement of administrative agencies. To
preserve ﬁrm reputation or due to pressure from the market, managers will forgo short-sighted and opportu-
nistic behavior and work to improve decision-making eﬃciency, thereby reducing agency costs. Additionally,
improvements to the media governance environment can reduce the cost of information transmission, allow-
ing market participants to obtain the relevant information to eﬀectively supervise managers and to increase the
costs and risks of managers not obeying the law or acting contrary to the will of shareholders. Thus, the media
can act as an implicit constraint mechanism and reduce agency costs.
Based on the important role that media governance plays in solving the “principal–agent” and
“information asymmetry” problems described above, we propose our ﬁrst research hypothesis:
H1. The level of media governance in the region where a ﬁrm is located is signiﬁcantly negatively related to
the level of corporate overinvestment in that region.
Corporate supervision by the media and the public is eﬀective in eliminating corruption caused by too much
power and a lack of constraints, making it an important supplement to corporate governance mechanisms (Xu
and Xin, 2011). When a ﬁrm’s internal management eﬃciency is low or its formal internal governance system
is not eﬀective, informal institutional mechanisms derived from external public supervision can play a more
pronounced role.
Thus, we propose our second research hypothesis:
H2. When internal corporate governance eﬃciency is low, the negative relationship between the level of media
governance and the degree of corporate overinvestment is signiﬁcantly enhanced.
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3.1. Research design
3.1.1. Overinvestment estimation
Overinvestment (Overinv) represents the extent of corporate investment beyond a reasonable level and is
measured as the amount by which the actual corporate investment level deviates from a normal level, where
the portion that is greater than the normal level is deﬁned as overinvestment.
We follow the framework of Richardson (2006) to estimate the normal level of investment. In constructing
the model, we consider not only the inﬂuence of investment opportunities (Growth) but also the scale of the
ﬁrm (Asset), its level of debt (Level), its market performance (Ret), the number of years the ﬁrm has been listed
(Age), the level of cash holdings (Cash) and other control variables. The eﬀects of time (Year) and industry
(Industry) are also controlled for. In addition, because ﬁrms’ investments in projects are often assigned to more
than one accounting period, we include the lag of investments. The speciﬁc calculations and deﬁnitions of the
variables are shown in Table 1. Yu et al. (2010), Tang et al. (2010) and Luo et al. (2012) use a similar
approach.
We construct a model for estimating the normal level of investment as follows:Table
Variab
Variab
name
Asset
Lev
Growth
Growth
Ret
Age
Cash
Inv1
Inv2
Overin
Overin
Overin
Media
HHI5
Magst
Duality
Boards
Idr
Fcf
Otac
SOE
EMInvi;t ¼ a0þb1Asseti;t1þb2Levi;t1þb3Growthi;t1þb4Reti;tþb5Agei;tþb6Cashi;t1þb7Invi;t1þ ei;t ð1Þ1
le deﬁnitions.
le Deﬁnition Calculation
Asset scale Natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage level Total liabilities/total assets
1 Growth1 Sales growth
2 Growth2 Tobin’s Q value, the ratio of market value to book value
Market return Cumulative return rate from May in year t to April in year t + 1
Number of years listed The number of years between the latest annual ﬁnancial report and the ﬁrm’s IPO
Cash holdings (Cash + short-term investments or tradable ﬁnancial assets)/total assets
Investment 1 (Cash for buying ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets – net cash for
disposing of recovered ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets)/total
assets
Investment 2 {Long-term assets at the end of the year – long-term assets at the beginning of the year)/
total assets at the beginning of the year
v1 Overinvestment 1 Overinvestment estimated using Inv1 and Growth1
v2 Overinvestment 2 Overinvestment estimated using Inv1 and Growth2
v3 Overinvestment 3 Overinvestment estimated using Inv2 and Growth1
Media governance The Chinese Media Development Index Report by Guoming Yu measures the degree of
regional media supervision. For the missing index for 2011, we adopt an OLS trend
prediction
Equity concentration The sum of the squares of the top ﬁve shareholders’ shareholding ratios
k Management shareholdings Managerial stockholding ratio
Chairman and general
manager combined
Whether the chairman and CEO roles are assumed by the same person; equals 1 if yes,
and 0 otherwise
ize The size of the board of
directors
Number of directors on the board
Ratio of independent
directors
Proportion of independent directors on the board of directors
Free cash ﬂow Natural logarithm of cash ﬂow from operations less capital expenditure
Large shareholder
governance
Other receivables/total assets
Nature of property rights Equals 1 for state-owned corporations, and 0 otherwise
Earnings management Absolute value of manipulated accrual level; equals 1 if the value is higher than the
median, and 0 otherwise
46 H. Zhang, Z. Su / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 41–57For the sake of robustness, based on Model (1) we deﬁne the normal investment level in three ways and
obtain three estimates of overinvestment.
1. Using Inv1 as a proxy for the level of actual investment and sales growth (Growth1) as a proxy for
corporate investment opportunities, we obtain the residual value Overinv1 as the level of
overinvestment. Wang (2009) uses this estimation method.
2. Using Inv1 as a proxy for the level of actual investment and the Tobin’s Q value (Growth2) as a proxy
for corporate investment opportunities, we obtain the residual value Overinv2 as the level of
overinvestment. Zhong et al. (2010) use this estimation method.
3. Using Inv2 as a proxy for the level of actual investment and sales growth (Growth1) as a proxy for
corporate investment opportunities, we obtain the residual value Overinv3 as the level of
overinvestment. Yang and Hu (2007) use this estimation method.3.1.2. Research model
To test Hypothesis 1, we establish the following research model:Overinv ¼ a0 þ b1Mediaþ b2HHI5þ b3Magtsk þ b4Duality þ b5Boardsizeþ b6Idr þ b7Fcf þ b8Lev
þ b9Otacþ
X
Year þ
X
Ind þ ei;t ð2ÞIn this model, the dependent variable is the corporation’s overinvestment level, which we estimate from
Model (1). The media governance variable (Media) is measured from the Chinese Media Development Index
Report (2008–2012), which systematically evaluates media development in China and, for the ﬁrst time, quan-
titatively examines its supervisory ability. The report also establishes the Chinese Media Development Index
(CMDI), which depicts the regional media environment in China theoretically. The greater the value of the
CMDI, the stronger the media supervision in that region (He and Wei, 2012; Wu et al., 2012). Because of
a lack of data for 2011, we use the 2007–2010 data to predict an OLS trend for the 2011 media governance
variable (Media). Following Tang et al. (2010) and Luo et al. (2012), we control for the corporate governance
variables of equity concentration level (HHI5), the proportion of management shareholdings (Magstk),
whether the chairman is also the CEO (Duality), the size of the board of directors (Boardsize) and the propor-
tion of independent directors on the board of directors (Idr). In addition, because studies show that free cash
ﬂow (Fcf) (Jensen, 1986; Fazzari et al., 1988), debt ratio (Lev) (Huang and Shen, 2009; Zhang and Wang,
2010) and tunneling by controlling shareholders (Otac) (Luo et al., 2008) are important factors that inﬂuence
overinvestment, we also control for these variables. Based on Hypothesis 1, we forecast the sign of b1 in
Model (2) to be signiﬁcantly negative.
We also test Hypothesis 2, that is, whether media governance inﬂuences overinvestment diﬀerently when
corporate internal governance eﬃciency is low. Based on Model (2), we use interaction terms for internal
governance eﬃciency and media governance in Model (3). To a certain extent, a company’s degree of earnings
management can be used as ex-post evidence of internal governance eﬃciency.
Following relevant research, such as that of Chen et al. (2013), we use the degree of earnings management
as a proxy for internal governance eﬃciency. We estimate the level of a ﬁrm’s non-discretionary accruals by
using the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model. Discretionary accruals are represented by regression residuals.
We adopt the absolute value of the residuals as a proxy for the degree of earnings management (EM). To
avoid collinearity issues, we group EM by its median; thus, ﬁrms with values higher than the median are
set to 1, and to 0 otherwise.Overinv ¼ a0 þ b1Mediaþ b2EM Mediaþ b3EM þ b4HHI5þ b5Magtsk þ b6Duality þ b7Boardsize
þ b8Idr þ b9Fcf þ b10Lev þ b11Otacþ
X
Year þ
X
Ind þ ei;t ð3Þ
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Variable Mean Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum Standard deviation
Asset 21.551 18.367 20.692 21.420 22.275 25.388 1.289
Lev 0.496 0.040 0.306 0.484 0.641 2.186 0.300
Growth1 0.270 0.786 0.001 0.155 0.340 6.056 0.771
Growth2 2.062 0.825 1.219 1.589 2.273 11.309 1.553
Ret 0.087 0.989 0.398 0.113 0.233 1.600 0.552
Age 9.325 1 4 10 14 19 5.405
Cash 0.212 0.004 0.090 0.159 0.283 0.791 0.174
Inv1 0.057 0.069 0.014 0.041 0.085 0.271 0.060
Inv2 0.065 0.286 0.004 0.039 0.111 0.655 0.134
Media 62.439 33.270 53.530 62.080 73.540 81.090 10.976
HHI5 0.172 0.013 0.076 0.145 0.245 0.567 0.121
Magstk 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.692 0.172
Duality 0.794 0 1 1 1 1 0.405
Boardsize 9.072 5 8 9 9 15 1.824
Idr 0.365 0.273 0.333 0.333 0.385 0.571 0.051
Fcf 19.019 14.387 18.042 18.993 19.984 23.311 1.610
Otac 0.023 0 0.004 0.010 0.024 0.228 0.037
SOE 0.508 0 0 1 1 1 0.500
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The sample comprises A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to
2011. Financial data for these companies are derived from the CSMAR database. Media governance data are
derived from the Chinese Media Development Index Report (2008–2012)2 and the industry classiﬁcations are
from the Industry Classiﬁcation Guidance of Listed Companies published by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). Consistent with similar studies, we remove (1) ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry and (2)
abnormal observation values from the sample, and obtain a sample of 9191 observations. Additionally, to
eliminate the inﬂuence of extreme values, we winsorize the continuous variables with extreme values in the
intervals of 0–1% and 99–100%. We also carry out accuracy checks on all of the data and adjust the estima-
tions for heteroskedasticity.4. Empirical tests and analysis of results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the main variables. We rule out the inﬂuence of outliers through
winsorization. The maximum value for the media governance variable (Media) is 81.090 while the minimum is
only 33.270. Thus, there are large diﬀerences between the media governance levels in diﬀerent regions, which
further indicates the signiﬁcance of this study.
We divide our sample into two groups according to whether the level of media governance (Media) for the
region in which each ﬁrm is located is greater than the median level.3 We test the mean levels of overinvest-
ment for the two groups via the indices Overinv1, Overinv2 and Overinv3. The results are shown in Table 3.
We can see from Table 3 that the mean level of overinvestment for the high media governance group is
signiﬁcantly lower than that of the low media governance group in all three columns. These results statistically2 The index covers ﬁve types of indicators: the media product index, the media proﬁt index, the audience consumption index, the
competitive advertisement index and the media environment index. The index covers mass media, social media and academic journals
through the dimensions of attention and inﬂuence. It objectively measures the media development index for 31 provinces, municipalities
and autonomous regions in China.
3 We eliminate those observations that are equal to the median, and use the same approach in Table 3.
Table 3
Results of t-tests for overinvestment under diﬀerent levels of media governance.
Year Media governance level Overinv1 Overinv2 Overinv3
Mean T value Mean T value Mean T value
2007 High 0.0046 2.65*** 0.0057 2.07** 0.0130 3.14***
Low 0.0035 0.0010 0.0026
2008 High 0.0034 2.58*** 0.0069 2.33** 0.0137 4.02***
Low 0.0048 0.0015 0.0016
2009 High 0.0095 3.31*** 0.0080 3.95*** 0.0184 4.52***
Low 0.0002 0.0045 0.0035
2010 High 0.0001 2.37** 0.0059 4.30*** 0.0172 5.22***
Low 0.0073 0.0080 0.0008
2011 High 0.0003 2.17** 0.0027 3.34*** 0.0158 4.01***
Low 0.0078 0.0107 0.0025
Total sample High 0.0030 5.30*** 0.0046 6.22*** 0.0151 8.94***
Low 0.0046 0.0051 0.0003
Notes: * p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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investment for all of the years from 2007 to 2011, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.4.2. Estimation of normal investment levels
Table 4 reports the estimations of the normal levels of investment. For each of the three estimation
methods, corporate scale (Asset), investment opportunities (Growth), market performance (Ret), ﬁrms’ cash
holding levels (Cash) and lagged levels of investment (Invi,t1) are signiﬁcantly positively related to the ﬁrms’
levels of corporate investment, while debt levels (Level) and listed years (Age) are signiﬁcantly negatively
related to corporate investment levels. These results are consistent with our expectations and with the results
of similar studies (e.g., Yu et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2012).4.3. Empirical results for Hypothesis 1
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analysis of media governance using the diﬀerent overinvestment
variables (Overinv1, Overinv2, and Overinv3).
We can see from columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 5 that, after controlling for year and industry eﬀects, media
governance (Media) and overinvestment (Overinv) are signiﬁcantly negatively related at the 1% level. We add
other control variables, the results of which are shown in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 5, and ﬁnd that the
results are still signiﬁcant. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is conﬁrmed. In addition, the regression coeﬃcient for Fcf is
positive. That is, the greater the free cash ﬂow in a ﬁrm, the higher the overinvestment level, indicating
signiﬁcant overinvestment behavior for high levels of free cash ﬂow within listed companies in China. The
results are consistent for all three estimation modes (Overinv1, Overinv2 and Overinv3).
We also explore whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between state-owned and non-state-owned listed
companies. Table 6 reports the results of the regression analysis using Overinv1 as the dependent variable.4
We ﬁnd that for both types of company, the coeﬃcients for media governance (Media) are signiﬁcantly
negative. We re-test these results using the interaction variable Media*SOE and give the results in the third4 This conclusion is also consistent using Overinv2 and Overinv3 as the dependent variables. These results are also consistent for the tests
that follow.
Table 4
Results of the estimation of normal investment levels.
Variable Overinv1 Overinv2 Overinv3
Asseti,t1 0.00313*** 0.00406*** 0.00995***
(0.00053) (0.00055) (0.00139)
Levi,t1 0.00860*** 0.00985*** 0.03657***
(0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00576)
Growth1i,t1 0.00165** 0.00658***
(0.00084) (0.00255)
Growth2i,t1 0.00181***
(0.00048)
Reti,t1 0.00444*** 0.00211*** 0.01792***
(0.00099) (0.00053) (0.00315)
Agei,t1 0.00083*** 0.00086*** 0.00259***
(0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00038)
Cashi,t1 0.04057*** 0.04245*** 0.09911***
(0.00519) (0.00507) (0.01347)
Inv1i,t1 0.49392*** 0.49447***
(0.01404) (0.01398)
Inv2i,t1 0.13462***
(0.01735)
Constant 0.06104*** 0.13566*** 0.10546***
(0.01045) (0.01179) (0.02824)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 7119 7200 7155
R2 0.41696 0.41604 0.12557
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
(2) The standard errors are shown in brackets. The following tables use the same method.
Table 5
Empirical results for the testing of Hypothesis 1.
Variable Overinv1 Overinv2 Overinv3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Media 0.00025*** 0.00028*** 0.00021*** 0.00028*** 0.00038*** 0.00041***
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00009) (0.00009)
HHI5 0.01637** 0.01377** 0.04093***
(0.00644) (0.00583) (0.00791)
Magstk 0.00057 0.01164** 0.00999
(0.00670) (0.00589) (0.00764)
Duality 0.00134 0.00247 0.00236
(0.00238) (0.00180) (0.00249)
Boardsize 0.00072* 0.00026 0.00106**
(0.00042) (0.00034) (0.00048)
Idr 0.02080 0.01738 0.02959*
(0.01309) (0.01204) (0.01536)
Fcf 0.00536*** 0.00544*** 0.00624***
(0.00052) (0.00042) (0.00059)
Lev 0.00126 0.00054*** 0.00646***
(0.00207) (0.00013) (0.00114)
Otac 0.01069 0.02202 0.03113
(0.02175) (0.01371) (0.01948)
Constant 0.12448*** 0.13039*** 0.01201*** 0.09635*** 0.14883*** 0.16615***
(0.00599) (0.01105) (0.00416) (0.01041) (0.00564) (0.01289)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 7118 4954 7200 5040 7128 4959
R2 0.03413 0.06486 0.00581 0.04907 0.09557 0.15639
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6
Media governance, property rights and overinvestment.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
State-owned Non-state-owned Total sample
Media 0.00029*** 0.00032** 0.00028**
(0.00008) (0.00015) (0.00013)
Media*SOE 0.00013
(0.00015)
SOE 0.00623
(0.00932)
HHI5 0.02053** 0.00075 0.01841***
(0.00810) (0.01139) (0.00566)
Magstk 0.00766 0.00315 0.00488
(0.01074) (0.00874) (0.00694)
Duality 0.00042 0.00133 0.00093
(0.00263) (0.00382) (0.00225)
Boardsize 0.00048 0.00157 0.00063
(0.00044) (0.00101) (0.00041)
Idr 0.01280 0.04775* 0.02549**
(0.01599) (0.02496) (0.01296)
Fcf 0.00475*** 0.00712*** 0.00544***
(0.00058) (0.00103) (0.00047)
Lev 0.00222 0.00183 0.00036
(0.00396) (0.00223) (0.00206)
Otac 0.03933** 0.02373 0.02719
(0.01838) (0.04698) (0.02109)
Constant 0.07078*** 0.08727*** 0.06616***
(0.01362) (0.02449) (0.01183)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 3040 1914 4954
R2 0.08369 0.08422 0.06548
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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coeﬃcients for the interaction variable are not signiﬁcant, indicating that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies.4.4. Empirical results for Hypothesis 2
Table 7 reports the test results for Hypothesis 2. We can see that the regression coeﬃcient for the interac-
tion term EM*Media is signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level. In Table 7, column 2, the coeﬃcient forMedia in
the group with low levels of internal governance is 0.00023, while that for the group with high levels of inter-
nal governance is 0.00035 (=0.00023–0.00012). These results conﬁrm Hypothesis 2; that is, when internal
corporate governance eﬃciency is low, the negative association between the level of media governance and the
degree of corporate overinvestment is signiﬁcantly enhanced. This result suggests that the media governance
environment plays a stronger complementary role for ﬁrms with low internal governance eﬃciency.4.5. Robustness tests
To guarantee the reliability of the results, we perform several robustness tests.4.5.1. Re-estimating the variable for overinvestment
Overinvestment (Overinv) is the core variable in this research. To ensure that our conclusions are not driven
by the method used to estimate overinvestment, we re-estimate overinvestment in the following ways.
Table 7
Empirical results for the testing of Hypothesis 2.
Variable (1) (2)
Media 0.00025*** 0.00023**
(0.00009) (0.00010)
EM*Media 0.00021** 0.00012**
(0.00009) (0.00006)
EM 0.00697 0.00686
(0.00810) (0.00844)
HHI5 0.02149***
(0.00615)
Magstk 0.00130
(0.00587)
Duality 0.00092
(0.00222)
Boardsize 0.00087**
(0.00039)
Idr 0.02344*
(0.01323)
Fcf 0.00514***
(0.00051)
Lev 0.00102
(0.00224)
Otac 0.01988
(0.02055)
Constant 0.01902*** 0.06163***
(0.00539) (0.01143)
Number of observations 7118 4954
R2 0.00636 0.04099
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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mate each ﬁrm’s normal investment level. We use the residual from the estimation as an additional proxy
for overinvestment, Overinv4. Following Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011), normal investment is
estimated in Model (4):5 Thlnvi;t ¼ a0 þ bGrowthi;t1 þ i;t ð4Þ
2. Based on the Overinv1 values estimated by Model (1), we retain only the sample group with residuals
greater than 0. The residual measures the overinvestment level, and we deﬁne it as Overinv5. Xin et al.
(2007) and Zhang and Lu (2012) use this method.
3. Based on the Overinv1 values estimated by Model (1), we divide the data into two categories. We set the
group with residual errors greater than 0 to 1 (the overinvestment group), and to 0 otherwise. We then
obtain the overinvestment estimator Overinv6, and adopt the Logit model for the regression. Jiang et al.
(2009) adopt this estimation method.
4. Based on the Overinv1 values estimated by Model (1), we group our observations by the quartile of the
residuals and set the dummy variable Overinv7 as a proxy for overinvestment. Following Biddle et al.
(2009) and Zhang and Lu (2012), we divide the residuals into four groups according to the quartiles.
The largest group is deﬁned as the overinvestment group and is assigned a value of 1. We delete the set with
the smallest residuals and deﬁne the two groups in the middle as the control group, the value of which is 0.
A probit model is used for the regression.
5. Studies examining company investment behavior show that cash ﬂow, debt levels and uncertainty are the
major factors aﬀecting the level of business investment. However, uncertainty variables are not included in
the estimation model used by Richardson (2006),5 which may distort the estimation of overinvestment. Weis method is the same as Model (1) earlier in this paper.
Table 8
Robustness tests 1.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overinv4-OLS Overinv 5-OLS Overinv 6-Logit Overinv 7-Probit
Media 0.00031*** 0.00021* 0.00951*** 0.00625***
(0.00007) (0.00011) (0.00296) (0.00218)
HHI5 0.00549 0.00950 0.11884 0.88480***
(0.00665) (0.00986) (0.26291) (0.19288)
Magstk 0.06543*** 0.01888** 1.89833*** 0.69482***
(0.00744) (0.00949) (0.22562) (0.16472)
Duality 0.00662*** 0.00356 0.35512*** 0.01855
(0.00200) (0.00276) (0.07700) (0.05681)
Boardsize 0.00061 0.00043 0.01708 0.00470
(0.00040) (0.00054) (0.01698) (0.01228)
Idr 0.00872 0.04224** 0.24491 0.30987
(0.01359) (0.01890) (0.57885) (0.42662)
Fcf 0.01123*** 0.00358*** 0.17587*** 0.14567***
(0.00049) (0.00067) (0.02119) (0.01584)
Lev 0.00009 0.00144 0.18172*** 0.01221
(0.00035) (0.00122) (0.04414) (0.02260)
Otac 0.09006*** 0.02790 1.27237* 1.72347***
(0.01599) (0.04234) (0.71336) (0.63035)
Constant 0.11232*** 0.01075 2.54870*** 3.00508***
(0.01182) (0.01934) (0.52299) (0.37663)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 5098 2076 5670 4467
R2 0.26492 0.07622 0.0673 0.0801
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Overinv2 and Overinv3 to generate three new overinvestment estimators, Overinv8, Overinv9 and Overinv10.
6. In general, ﬁrms with high levels of free cash ﬂow and a lack of investment opportunities tend to overinvest.
We divide the sample ﬁrms into overinvestment and underinvestment groups based on these two variables,
forming a new variable Overinv11. For both free cash ﬂow and investment opportunities, we divide the
ﬁrms into high and low groups by the medians, with investment opportunities being measured by the
Tobin’s Q values (Zhong et al., 2010). We deﬁne Overinv11 as being equal to 1 for ﬁrms with a combination
of high free cash ﬂow and low investment opportunities, and 0 otherwise. Because this overinvestment esti-
mation method is not based on Richardson (2006), some ﬁrm-level characteristic variables are not eﬀec-
tively controlled for and we thus add these to the regressions.
The regression results for media governance using the four estimation methods for overinvestment (Over-
inv4, Overinv5, Overinv6, and Overinv7) are shown in estimations (1), (2), (3) and (4) in Table 8. The results
using estimation methods (5) and (6) (Overinv8, Overinv9, Overinv10, and Overinv11) are shown in Table 9.
In all cases, the coeﬃcients for the media governance variable (Media) are signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting
that our conclusions are not aﬀected by the overinvestment estimation method used.
4.5.2. Balanced panel data
To examine as many ﬁrms as possible, the foregoing results are based on non-balanced panel data, which
may cause bias. We re-select the sample retaining only those listed ﬁrms with complete data for the ﬁve years
from 2007 to 2011, and perform the tests again. The results for Overinv1, as an example, are given in Table 10,
column 1. The regression results show that the coeﬃcient for media governance (Media) is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative, which is consistent with our previous results.
Table 9
Robustness tests 2.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overinv 8-OLS Overinv 9-OLS Overinv 10-OLS Overinv 11-probit
Media 0.00024*** 0.00024*** 0.00062*** 0.00478**
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00016) (0.00243)
HHI5 0.01462** 0.01641*** 0.08274*** 0.76693***
(0.00596) (0.00565) (0.01403) (0.22194)
Magstk 0.00283 0.01175** 0.03731*** 0.66298***
(0.00633) (0.00488) (0.00857) (0.21958)
Duality 0.00314* 0.00322* 0.00071 0.03826
(0.00187) (0.00175) (0.00393) (0.06388)
Boardsize 0.00041 0.00069** 0.00399*** 0.00726
(0.00035) (0.00035) (0.00101) (0.01370)
Idr 0.01609 0.02167* 0.07027** 0.24077
(0.01215) (0.01206) (0.03019) (0.46628)
Fcf 0.00515*** 0.00578*** 0.02080*** 0.33683***
(0.00043) (0.00042) (0.00109) (0.02484)
Lev 0.00396*** 0.00350*** 0.00436 0.10250***
(0.00094) (0.00098) (0.00283) (0.02781)
Otac 0.02010 0.01528 0.05264 0.31735
(0.01531) (0.01562) (0.04807) (0.70104)
Asset 0.38911***
(0.03562)
Growth 0.07653*
(0.03948)
Return 0.63669***
(0.07333)
Age 0.01717***
(0.00654)
Cash 0.23504
(0.19738)
Constant 0.12766*** 0.04767*** 0.20275*** 14.35959***
(0.01013) (0.01041) (0.02989) (0.62496)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 4896 5435 5446 4938
R2 0.07833 0.08167 0.10674 –
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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We use OLS trend prediction to estimate the media governance variable (Media) for 2011 from an averaged
index of media development for each of 2007 to 2010 and the Media Development Index for 2010. In this way
we obtain new estimators Media2 and Media3. We re-run the tests and provide the results in Table 10 (using
the dependent variable Overinv1 as an example, the results are the same as before).
The media governance levels are measured by the regional media governance environment and this may be
highly correlated with the overall environment and with the marketization level in diﬀerent regions. To pre-
vent a potential inﬂuence on our estimations, we perform the following two supplementary tests. First, we add
control variables for the marketization index (Market) to Model (2) to rule out the eﬀect of the degree of
marketization on the results. This index is derived from the marketization report of Fan et al. (2011) for
China.6 Second, we use the Baidu Media Index (Media4) to reassess the levels of media governance. We
hand-collect the Baidu Media Index data for all of the listed companies in 2011 (to be statistically consistent,6 The index consists of 23 indicators, with each indicator scoring all of the provinces by establishing the relative position of the
marketization process in each ﬁeld. We use principal component analysis to determine each individual item’s weight in the aspects index,
and use these weights to calculate an aspects index. In addition, we use the same method to determine each aspect’s weight in the total
index, and use these weights to calculate the total index.
Table 10
Robustness test 3.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Media 0.00029*** 0.00026*** 0.00036*** 0.00026***
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00007)
Media2 0.00026***
(0.00008)
Media3 0.00027***
(0.00008)
Media4 0.00021*
(0.00012)
ST*Media 0.00023***
(0.00008)
ST 0.00357
(0.06897)
HHI5 0.01597** 0.01638** 0.01636** 0.01589** 0.01882*** 0.01913*** 0.02266***
(0.00662) (0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00637) (0.00607) (0.00627)
Magstk 0.00287 0.00058 0.00060 0.00095 0.00167 0.00176 0.00317
(0.00809) (0.00671) (0.00670) (0.00673) (0.00663) (0.00608) (0.00616)
Duality 0.00073 0.00135 0.00134 0.00126 0.00115 0.00124 0.00128
(0.00249) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00240) (0.00195) (0.00195)
Boardsize 0.00070* 0.00072* 0.00072* 0.00072* 0.00070* 0.00067* 0.00098**
(0.00043) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00040) (0.00041)
Idr 0.02149 0.02078 0.02084 0.01997 0.01873 0.02598* 0.02142
(0.01347) (0.01309) (0.01309) (0.01301) (0.01305) (0.01404) (0.01408)
Fcf 0.00519*** 0.00536*** 0.00536*** 0.00534*** 0.00543*** 0.00538*** 0.00526***
(0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00053) (0.00046) (0.00048)
Lev 0.00138 0.00127 0.00126 0.00124 0.00123 0.00048 0.00171
(0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00203) (0.00164) (0.00167)
Otac 0.01346 0.01037 0.01059 0.00872 0.00538 0.02767 0.01965
(0.02192) (0.02176) (0.02176) (0.02179) (0.02186) (0.02056) (0.02091)
Market 0.00009
(0.00035)
Constant 0.00074 0.03759*** 0.03724*** 0.03415*** 0.05148*** 0.05695*** 0.05889***
(0.01178) (0.01143) (0.01145) (0.01198) (0.01178) (0.01103) (0.01202)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled – Controlled
Number of observations 4734 4954 4954 4927 4951 4954 4954
R2 0.06318 0.06471 0.06480 0.06495 0.06250 0.03433 0.04073
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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of other regional factors as much as possible. The results are given in Table 10, columns 2, 3, 4 and 5.7
The coeﬃcients for the media governance variables (Media2, Media3 and Media4) are all signiﬁcantly
negative. After controlling for the marketization variable, the coeﬃcient for media governance (Media) is still
signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that the results are not aﬀected by the method used to measure media
governance.
4.5.4. Re-selecting the econometric method
The main econometric method used is OLS. A panel data model is likely to have fewer missing variables,
allowing better elimination of the eﬀect of these non-observed factors. We also examine how ﬁxed eﬀects
inﬂuence the results. The regression results are given in Table 10, column 6. The coeﬃcient for the media
governance variable (Media) is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that the results are not aﬀected
by the econometric method used.7 The Baidu Media Index is a number related to the keywords recorded by the Baidu news channel for Internet media news reports.
Table 11
Endogeneity tests.
Variable (1) (2)
2SLS GMM
Media 0.00032*** 0.00049***
(0.00009) (0.00018)
HHI5 0.01592** 0.00525
(0.00639) (0.02262)
Magstk 0.00094 0.03538
(0.00666) (0.04553)
Duality 0.00139 0.00109
(0.00234) (0.00348)
Boardsize 0.00072* 0.00014
(0.00042) (0.00087)
Idr 0.02101 0.02397
(0.01297) (0.01617)
Fcf 0.00538*** 0.00503***
(0.00051) (0.00063)
Lev 0.00127 0.00201
(0.00205) (0.00237)
Otac 0.01158 0.03772
(0.02147) (0.03748)
Constant 0.05921*** 0.01728
(0.01179) (0.04589)
Year Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled
Number of observations 4954 4954
R2 0.06478 –
Notes: (1)* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
H. Zhang, Z. Su / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 41–57 554.5.5. Re-estimating the variable for internal governance eﬃciency
The preceding portion of this paper uses the work of Chen et al. (2013) to choose the proxy for the internal
governance eﬃciency of a company. To test the robustness of Hypothesis 2, we use ST ﬁrms (ST) as the
measure of low internal governance eﬃciency, setting ST to 1 when a ﬁrm receives special treatment, and 0
otherwise. Column 10 of Table 7 gives the results. The regression coeﬃcient for the interaction variable
ST*Media is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. These results conﬁrm Hypothesis 2; that is, when corporate
internal governance eﬃciency is lower, the negative relationship between the level of external media
supervision and overinvestment is more pronounced.
4.5.6. Endogeneity tests
According to past research, many factors inﬂuence overinvestment (Overinv), such as the institutional
environment (Yang and Hu, 2007), bank credit (Luo et al., 2012), cash distributions (Zhang and Lu, 2012)
and the background governance (Jiang et al., 2009). Extra-regional governance indicators such as these are
correlated with some extent with media governance (Media). There may also be a bias caused by omitted
variables in the foregoing results.
Accordingly, this paper further adopts the instrumental variable method to solve the problem of
endogeneity. We use four variables as instrumental variables: the per capita number of newspapers in print
(Newspaper), the per capita number of magazines in print (Magazine), TV ownership per 100 households
(Television), and computer ownership per 100 households (Computer). The data are derived from the China
Statistical Yearbook (2008–2012) and the Collection of China Press and Publication Statistical Data
(2008–2012). These variables are highly correlated with media governance (Media) (the correlation coeﬃcients
are 0.375, 0.710, 0.554, and 0.871, respectively), but no direct relationship between these variables and
overinvestment (Overinv1) is found (the correlation coeﬃcients are 0.026, 0.026, 0.058, and 0.052,
respectively). We re-estimate the results using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions; column 1 in Table 11
shows the results. Then, to take account of heteroskedasticity within a large sample, we use the generalized
method of moments (GMM); the results of which are shown in column 2 of Table 11.
56 H. Zhang, Z. Su / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 41–57The regression results are consistent with the previous conclusion that media governance (Media) and over-
investment (Overinv) are signiﬁcantly negatively related.
Having carried out these tests, we believe that this paper’s conclusions are robust.
5. Conclusion and discussion
Based on China’s A-share listed ﬁrms from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically tests how the level of media
governance aﬀects the level of corporate overinvestment. We ﬁnd that when a region has a stronger media
governance environment, levels of overinvestment by corporations are lower, suggesting that media gover-
nance signiﬁcantly restricts overinvestment behavior. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in media governance
between state-owned and non-state-owned corporations. Further, when corporate governance eﬃciency is
low, the negative relationship between the media environment and overinvestment behavior is signiﬁcantly
enhanced. To guarantee the reliability of our results, we carry out multiple robustness tests, but the results
remain unchanged.
This paper shows that a strong media supervision environment can create potential constraints on corpo-
rations that help to reduce overinvestment. In particular, when a formal system of internal governance fails,
external supervision or informal institutional mechanisms can play an important supplementary role. Our con-
clusions highlight the important role played by media supervision in corporate governance, and especially in
overinvestment, from the perspective of external corporations or informal institutions.
It should be noted that our focus is on the eﬀect of the media governance environment in the region in
which a corporation is located on the local investment eﬃciency of listed companies and we do not speciﬁcally
analyze the degree to which ﬁrms’ behavior may vary under the inﬂuence of emerging media that can break
through regional limits, such as the media’s interest in individual corporations, micro-blogging and Weixin.
These types of media could be the focus of future research.
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